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CONSUMER STANDING IN ANTITRUST ACTIONS
Reiter v. Sonotone Corporation, 442 U.S. 330 (1979)
The United States Supreme Court in Reiter v. Sonotone Corporation'
broadened the class of plaintiffs who have standing2 to sue under sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act3 to include retail consumers.4
The plaintiff5 brought a class action suit on behalf of herself and all
persons in the United States who purchased hearing aids,6 seeking
treble damages against five manufacturers7 under section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act.' Plaintiff alleged that the corporations violated sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act9 by engaging in vertical and horizontal price-
fixing,"t which caused plaintiff to pay inflated prices for hearing aids
and related services." Defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that
plaintiff lacked standing' 2 to sue under section 4 because the allegedly
anticompetitive acts had not injured plaintiff in her "business and
1 442 U.S. 330 (1979). The district court decision on remand from the United States
Supreme Court is cited at [1980-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,212 (D. Minn. 1980).
2. See note 17 infra and accompanying text.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
4. Consumers, however, will face substantial obstacles in order to successfully bring suit.
See note 74 infra and accompanying text.
5. The plaintiff was a "classic consumer plaintiff." She was not in any business related to
that of the defendant, and alleged no property interest other than that she had spent more money
for a hearing aid than necessary because of defendant's misconduct. 442 U.S. at 335.
6. Plaintiff and members of the class did not purchase hearing aids directly from the defend-
ant manufacturers, but rather from retailers. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th
Cir. 1978).
7. The Supreme Court held in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), that only
direct purchasers may sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. See note 18
infra. The Illinois Brick issue was not before the Supreme Court in Reiter because the Court of
Appeals did not decide whether the Illinoir Brick rule barred the plaintiffs' claim. 442 U.S. at 337
n.3.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). For the complete text see note 3 supra.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
10. Plaintiff claimed that the corporations:
restricted the territories, customers, and brands of hearing aids offered by their retail
dealers, used the customer lists of their retail dealers for their own purposes, prohibited
unauthorized retailers from dealing in or repairing their hearing aids, and conspired
among themselves and with their retail dealers to fix the retail prices of the hearing aids.
442 U.S. at 335 n.l.
11. Id at 335.
12. The term "standing" in this comment does not refer to standing in the constitutional
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property" within the meaning of the Act. The district court denied the
motion;13 the Eighth Circuit reversed. 4  The United States Supreme
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held: Consumers who pay a
higher price for goods purchased for personal use as a result of antitrust
violations are injured in their "property" within the meaning of section
4.15
Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes the award of treble damages
to "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."' 6 The federal courts
have limited the reach of this clause by developing two prerequisites
for standing. 7 A plaintiff must show, in addition to establishing an
antitrust violation, that: (1) the violation caused the alleged injury;' 8
and (2) the alleged injury in the plaintiffs' business or property was a
sense, but rather to the statutory right to sue for damages, which was created under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. For components of standing, see notes 18 & 19 infra and accompanying text.
13. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933, 934, 938 (D. Minn. 1977), rep'd, 579 F.2d
1077 (8th Cir. 1978), rep'd, 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
14. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
15. 442 U.S. at 342-43.
16. See note 4 supra.
17. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 n.l 1 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.), cer.
denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Ragar v. T.J. Raney & Sons, 388 F. Supp. 1184, 1186-87 (E.D. Ark.),
a'd, 521 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1975). See generally Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
The courts have limited standing in this area because a grant of standing to any party would
lead to a multiplicity of lawsuits. See Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre
Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). See also
Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 374, 375-76 (1976).
18. The courts have interpreted the causal requirement to require a satisfaction of one of
three tests: direct injury test, target area test, or zone of interest test.
The direct injury test provides that, in the limited area of consumer suits, the "first party to
purchase a product that has been affected by a violation has standing to sue, and all others...
are barred." Comment, Mangano and Ultimate Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover
Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 394,400 (1972). The Third Circuit first used the direct injury test in
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910). See generally Bravman v. Basset
Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Reibert v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); Billy Baxter, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963);
United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), affirmed the direct
injury test. The court held that a purchaser, other than a direct purchaser from the manufacturer,
who pays higher prices because of a manufacturer's antitrust violation may not sue under section
4. See generally Note, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: Can Section 4 ofthe Claylon Act Sur-
vive the Current Supreme Court, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 81, 109-12 (1978); Note, Scaling the Illinois
Brick Wall- The Future of Indirect Purchasers in Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 309
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type protected by section 4.19
The issue of standing based on injury to plaintiffs' business or prop-
erty has long been disputed. The phrase "business or property," if in-
terpreted conjunctively, causes the adjective "business"'20 to modify
(1978); Note, Illinois Brick: The Death Knell of Ultimate ConsumerAntitrust Suits, 52 ST. JOHNS
L. REV. 421 (1978).
The court in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loews, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952), articulated the target area test. The target area test requires only that
a plaintiff suffer injury from residing within a sector of the economy in which the illegal activity
was directed rather than imposing a strict privity requirement.
[I]n order to have "standing" to sue for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, a
person must be within the "target area" of the alleged antitrust conspiracy, i.e., a person
against whom the conspiracy was aimed, such as a competitor of the persons sued. Ac-
cordingly we have drawn a line excluding those who have suffered economic damage by
virtue of their relationship with "targets" or with participants in an alleged antitrust
conspiracy, rather than by being "targets" themselves.
Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). See Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime
Union of America, 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); Tugboat, Inc. v.
Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129
(5th Cir. 1975); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 US. 919 (1974); Lytle & Pardue, Antitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 570, 581 (1964). See also Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v.
Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil
Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955); Kemp Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc. v. Hartford Auto. Dealers' Ass'n,
380 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Conn. 1974); Fields Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), alf'd, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971).
See generally' Lytle & Pardue, Antitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Determi-
nation of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 795 (1976).
The zone of interest test, articulated in Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir.
1975), contains two requirements: (1) plaintiff must assert injury in fact caused by defendant, and
(2) the protected interest must be within the zone of interests protected under the statute in ques-
tion. 521 F.2d at 1151. See also Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d
679, 689 (8th Cir. 1966). Outside the Sixth Circuit, few courts have used the Malamud test. For a
criticism of the standard, see Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 374 (1976). See generally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Stand-
ing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 813 (1977); Note, Standing to Suefor Treble Damages Under Section 4 ofthe
Clavton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570, 581 (1964).
19. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). See also notes 28-47 infra and accompanying text.
20. The court in Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), defined
"business" under section 4 as follows:
The word "business" is a conclusory term. It covers a broad spectrum of rights, powers
and privileges which, singly or collectively, has conventionally been labeled "business"
for the purpose of § 4 of the Clayton Act. There must be some modicum of existing
economic power or control. To some extent, this may be circular logic inasmuch as the
term "business" is a conclusion rather than a reason. It is a conclusion justified, how-
ever, by the analogous factual patterns of other decided cases.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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"property."'" This interpretation limits standing to commercial inju-
ries. Conversely, the disjunctive interpretation of the phrase gives
"property" an independent meaning so that an individual consumer
who pays an inflated price22 because of an antitrust violation is granted
standing.23  The legislative histories of the Sherman 24 and Clayton 25
Acts do not settle this issue,26 and courts have drawn divergent conclu-
Id at 83. See Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Mass,
1956). See also Blackford, "Business or Property" Entitled to Protection Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 26 MERCER L. REV. 737 (1975); Note, Standing to Suefor Treble Damages Under
Section 4 ofthe Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964).
21. Property for the purposes of section 4 is defined very broadly to include every interest
that the law protects.
A determination whether plaintiff has "property" involves a value judgement as to
whether that which plaintiff factually possesses should be legally protected. If it be de-
cided that the rights, privileges and powers possessed by the plaintiff should receive judi-
cial sanction, the conclusion would be expressed by declaring [that] plaintiff possesses
"property."
Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
22. See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
23. See note 12 supra.
24. The legislative history of the Sherman Act is not conclusive on the question of standing.
The bill originally introduced by Senator Sherman provided that "any person or corporation,
injured or damnified by such arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, or combination may sue for
and recover. . . the full consideration or sum paid by him for any goods, wares and merchandise
. .. S.I, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1889), reprinted in THE LEGISL TIVE HISTORY OF THE FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES (E. Kintner ed. 1978). Congress rejected Sena-
tor Sherman's proposal, and enacted section 7 instead to provide that "Any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything
forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue ... " Ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). Although the reasons for the change are unclear, Con-
gress evidently expressed some concern for limiting private actions because Senator Morgan
warned that the "bill ought not to be a breeder of lawsuits. If there is any duty we have got higher
than another in respect of the general judiciary of the United States, it is to suppress litigation and
have justice done without litigation as far as we can." 21 CONG. REc. 3149 (1890). But Senator
George expressed dissatisfaction with the enacted bill:
[Tihe poor man, the consumer, the laborer, the farmer, the mechanic, the country
merchant, all that large class of American citizens who constitute 90 percent of our popu-
lation and who are the real sufferers will have no opportunity of redress, and the bill, so
far as they are concerned, will be a snare and a mere delusion.
21 CONG. REC. 3150 (1890). See generally Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 486 n.10 (1977); Comment, Closing the Door on Consumer Antitrust Standing, 54 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 237, 249-54 (1979); Note, Recent Developments in Antitrust Standing, 31 VAND. L. REV. 153 1,
1533-36 (1978).
25. Representative Taggart claimed that "[t]he bill is framed for the purpose of liberating
business and not for the purpose of injuring or destroying any business. Its great purpose is to
protect small business from big business ...." 51 CONG. REC. 9198 (1914). Nothing, however,
in the legislative history indicates that proponents of the bill aimed exclusively at business. See
Comment, Closing the Door on Consumer Antitrust Standing, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 237, 252 (1979).
26. See generallyTHE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RE-
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sions to the proper interpretation.27
The United States Supreme Court provided a definition of section 4
property in Chattanooga Foundry and P#pe Works v. City of Atlanta.2"
The city of Atlanta owned and operated its own water works system
and supplied itself and its inhabitants with water.29 The city alleged
that defendant foundry's anticompetitive conduct forced Atlanta to
purchase water pipes3" in excess of a fair market price. The defendant
claimed that the city was not injured in its "business or property." 3'
Although Justice Holmes could have concluded that defendant had in-
jured the city in its business of supplying water, Holmes rather ruled
that defendant's inflated prices injured the city's property.32 Holmes'
interpretation lends credence to the disjunctive interpretation. The
Court held that an injury to property33 will be found if plaintiffs
LATED STATUTES 13-30 (E. Kintner ed. 1978); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY
164-210 (1955).
27, The Supreme Court reached a typical conclusion in a footnote to Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977):
Treble-damages antitrust actions were first authorized by § 7 of the Sherman Act, 26
Stat. 210 (1890). The discussions of this section on the floor of the Senate indicate that it
was conceived of primarily as a remedy for "[t]he people of the United States as individ-
uals," especially consumers. Treble damages were provided in part for punitive pur-
poses. but also to make the remedy meaningful by counterbalancing "the difficulty of
maintaining a private suit against a combination such as is described" in the Act....
When Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914, it "extend[ed] the remedy under
section 7 of the Sherman Act" to persons injured by virtue of any antitrust viola-
tion. . . .The initial House debates concerning provisions related to private damages
actions reveal that these actions were conceived primarily as "open[ing] the door ofjus-
tice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws,
and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered."... The House
debates following the conference committee report, however, indicate that the sponsors
of the bill also saw treble-damages suits as an important means of enforcing the
law. . . . In the Senate there was virtually no discussion of the enforcement value of
private actions, even though the bill was attacked as lacking meaningful sanctions ....
Id at 486 n.10 (citations omitted). Other courts have reached opposite conclusions based on the
identical legislative history. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 1978),
rei'd, 442 U.S. 330 (1979). See also Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.
LAW & ECON. 7 (1966).
28. 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
29. M. FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER 302-03 (1956) (Atlanta was both a con-
sumer of its own water and a producer with a commercial injury).
30. 203 U.S. at 395.
31. Id at 395-96.
32. Id at 396-97.
33. The city of Atlanta distinguished between damage "to" and "in" one's property by claim-
ing damage "in" its property. The latter injury is generally considered broader than injury "to"
property.
[A] consumer may sue for damages on the ground that he has been deprived "in" his
Washington University Open Scholarship
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"property is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced. '34
Subsequent courts held that consumers who paid higher prices for
goods or services as a result of antitrust violations 'vere injured in their
property and were entitled to standing.35
The Supreme Court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 36 further compli-
cated the standing issue. The state of Hawaii brought an action on
behalf of its citizens to recover overcharges on petroleum products re-
sulting from antitrust violations by Standard Oil." The Court, in dicta,
stated that the term "business.or property" referred to "commercial in-
terests or enterprises, '38 and denied standing39 because Hawaii's al-
property, although he has not had any particular piece of property per se injured. In
other words, the differential between the exacted price and that of free competition in-
volves an injury in the consumer's property. In the logical line of this argument a con-
sumer may maintain a private suit for treble damages because he has actually suffered an
injury to his property.
M. FoRKOSCH, supra note 29, at 300 (footnote omitted).
34. 203 U.S. at 396. See also Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1916) (excess over reasonable
rate charged by carrier constitutes element of injury); Cleary v. Chalk, 488 F.2d 1315, 1319 n.17
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (a consumer of services who is illegally overcharged sustains a property injury
within the ambit of § 4). See generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 771 (1977); Note, Standing to
Suefor Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964).
35. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1978); Brunswick v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-
63 (1972); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 99 n.23 ( 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 823 (1977); Theophil v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 446 F. Supp. 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
DeGregorio v. Segal, 443 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in
Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, [1977-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,639 (C.D. Cal. 1977); In
re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, [1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,434 (D.D.C. 1977). Contra,
Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd without opinion,
608 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1979); Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1221
(N.D. Cal. 1977), aj'd inpart and vacated in part, 604 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., [1977-I] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,251 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
36. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
37. The principal issue in the case did not involve consumer standing directly, but whether
section 4 authorized a state to sue for an injury to its general economy. 405 U.S. at 252-53, The
injury allegedly stemmed from changes in revenues to, and taxes on, the general citizenry, lost
business opportunities, prevention of full development of the state's resources, and frustration of
the state's policy of promoting general progress and the welfare of its people. 405 U.S. at 255.
38. 405 U.S. at 264.
39. Although the Court denied Hawaii the right to recover for injury to the general economy
of the state, the Court stated that Hawaii would have standing to sue if it sought recovery for
injuries suffered in its capacity as a consumer of goods and services:
Where the injury to the State occurs in its capacity as a consumer in the marketplace,
through a "payment of money wrongfully induced," damages are established by the
amount of the overcharge. . . . Measurement of an injury to the general economy, on
the other hand, necessarily involves an examination of the impact of a restraint of trade
upon every variable that affects the State's economic health-a task extremely difficult,
"in the real economic world rather than an economist's hypothetical model."
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leged injury did not affect the state in its role as a commercial entity.40
The lower courts are divided on the issue of section 4 consumer
standing. 41 In Weinberg v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. ,42 a retail
consumer alleged that a department store chain injured her property
and committed an antitrust violation by overcharging for clothes she
had purchased. A California district court concluded that the words
"business or property" are conjunctive and require a competitive or
commercial injury because Congress designed the antitrust laws to en-
hance competition among commercial enterprises.43 The court denied
plaintiff standing because she did not allege a commercial or competi-
tive injury.' In Theophil v. Sheller-Globe Corp.,4 however, a New
York district court concluded that Congress intended the antitrust laws
to benefit the consumer46 and that if the consumer pays inflated prices
because of an antitrust violation, an injury to property exists under the
rule in Chattanooga Foundry.4 7
The Supreme Court in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. faced the consumer
405 U.S. at 262 n.14 (quoting Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S.
390, 396 (1906), and Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968)).
40. 405 U.S. at 262-65. In response to the ruling in Hawaii, Congress in 1976 enacted the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976), which amended the
Clayton Act to permit "state attorneys general to recover monetary damages on behalf of state
residents injured by violation of the antitrust laws," H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2572.
41. Several recent district court decisions have denied consumer standing. See, e.g., Wein-
berg v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd without opinion, 608
F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1979); Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., 425 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal.
1977), af'd in part and vacated in part, 604 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., [1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,251 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Other courts, however, have
reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Products Antitrust Litigation, [1977-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,639 (C.D. Cal. 1977); In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, [1977-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,434 (D.D.C. 1977); In re Master
Key Antitrust Litigation, 11973-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General
Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); State of West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F.
Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); See also Note, Standing to Suefor
Treble Damage Under Section 4 ofthe Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 570 (1964).
42. 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd without opinion, 608 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1979).
43. Id at 884-85.
44. Id at 882-85.
45. 446 F. Supp. 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
46. Id at 135.
47. 203 U.S. 390 (1906). See 446 F. Supp. at 135.
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standing issue4 8 for the first time.4 9 Chief Justice Burger held that
"business" does not modify "property" because50 "terms connected by
a disjunctive [should] be given separate meanings. . . . "5 The Court
relied on Justice Holmes' broad definition of "property" in Chattanoo-
ga52 to find that plaintiff's payment of a slightly higher price was suffi-
cient to establish standing under section 4.53
The Court in Reiter qualified language in Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co. 54 that referred to property as encompassing "commercial interests
or enterprises. ' 55 Chief Justice Burger stated that "commercial inter-
est" refers to any transaction in the marketplace, rather than an exclu-
sively business related transaction. 6 He further noted that currency
falls within the definition of property 57 and, thus, an overcharge paid
by a consumer because of an antitrust violation is actionable under sec-
tion 4.58 The Court stated that the phrase "business or property" was
sufficiently restrictive to exclude some injuries from section 4 protec-
tion.5 9
Chief Justice Burger found no specific reference to the interpretation
of the phrase "business or property" in the legislative history.60 He
rejected the contention that substitution of "business or property" for
broader language demonstrated a congressional intent to exclude retail
consumers. 6t  Chief Justice Burger stated that the floor debates re-
flected no intent62 to exclude retail consumers and that proponents sup-
ported the legislation to protect the consumer.63
48. In fact, Reiter was the first retail consumer standing case to reach a federal appellate
court.
49. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
50. Justice Burger stated that the Court must give effect to "every word Congress used" in
construing a statute, and concluded that "canons of construction" dictated the result unless the
context indicated otherwise. Id at 2331.
51. Id
52. Id See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
53. 442 U.S. at 340.
54. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
55. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
56. 442 U.S. at 341-42.
57. Id at 338.
58. Id at 339.
59. Id See also Hamman v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 420, 432 (D. Mont. 1967).
60. 442 U.S. at 342-43.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id Justice Burger cited the footnote in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 486 n.10 (1977) in support of his conclusion. See note 27 supra.
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Number 3] STANDING IN ANTITRUST ACTIONS
The Court rebutted critics who claimed that broadening standing
would overburden the courts' by emphasizing the necessity of private
suits for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.65 Chief Justice
Burger placed the responsibility on Congress to modify the court sys-
tem to accommodate any additional caseload.66 He also suggested that
judges employ their authority and discretion under Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure61 to prevent frivolous suits. 68
The decision in Reiter is consistent with the policy of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts to prevent restraints on trade and encourage free
competition. 69 The private treble damage action under section 4 is an
effective means to achieve those goals.7" The private action not only
compensates the injured party, but also deters violations7" of the anti-
trust laws.
64. In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist expressed greater concern than the majority
on this issue. 442 U.S. at 345-46.
65. Id at 344.
66. Id
67. The class representative must demonstrate compliance with the requirements of Rule 23
in order to maintain a class action. Subsection (a) requires that:
(1) joinder be impracticable because of the large number of class members;
(2) there be common questions of law or fact;
(3) the claims of the representative be typical of the claims of the class; and
(4) the class representative fairly and adequately represent the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
68. 442 U.S. at 345. Commentators have disagreed on whether broadened antitrust standing
would flood the courts with baseless suits. See generally Berger & Bernstein, AnAnalytical Frame-
workfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977).
69. In Cleary v. Chalk, 488 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court stated:
The goal of the Federal antitrust laws is to safeguard the interplay of competitive forces
in the far-flung commerce of the Nation. The Sherman Act. . . "was designed to be a
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered com-
petition as the rule of trade." Its "fundamental purpose. . . was to secure equality of
opportunity and to protect the public against evils commonly incident to destruction of
competition through monopolies and combinations in restraints of trade." . . . "The
Clayton Act. .. had these wholesome aims no less in view, but sought its contribution
to them through a regulatory technique of its own."
Cleary v. Chalk, 488 F.2d 1315, 1319-20 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citations omitted).
70. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). See
Duval, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experience (1), 1976
AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1023, 1026; Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of
Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 168-69 (1958); Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits.- The
Government's ChiefAid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954); Note, supra note 25, at 259-266.
But see Breit & Elzinga, Antitrutt Enforcement and Economic Efficiency.: The Uneasy Casefor
Treble-Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1974); Parker, The Deterrent Effect ofPrivate Treble Dam-
age Suits: Fact or Fantasy, 3 N.M.L. REV. 286, 293 (1973); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage
Actions. Do They Work, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319 (1973).
71. See Duval, supra note 68, at 1025-26.
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Retail consumer standing is a potent deterrent because the consumer
on many occasions is the only party interested in challenging an anti-
trust violation.72 Neither retailers, who desire to maintain their distri-
bution rights, nor competitors, who may be co-conspirators, are likely
to file an antitrust action. Even competitors who do not participate in
the scheme may be unwilling to sue under section 4 because they also
profit from the imposition of uniformly high prices. 73 Although the
government files most antitrust actions, the broader standing require-
ments may encourage prosecution of smaller price-fixing schemes that
are beyond government inquiry. 74
The additional burdens placed on the courts do not outweigh bene-
fits derived from broader consumer standing. The number of consumer
plaintiffs will remain limited by the causal requirements of standing
and will be subject to the direct injury, target area, and protected zone
of interest tests.75 Moreover, the difficulty of proving damages, the
substantial cost of litigation, and the range of defenses available to de-
fendants will discourage speculative claims,76 and will reduce any addi-
tional burden on the courts.
72. See Comment, Denial of Standing to Privale Noncommercial Consumers Under Section 4
of the Clayton Act, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1531,1545-46 (1978).
73. Id
74. See Note, supra note 25, at 261-62.
75. See notes 17-19 supra. See also Loevinger, supra note 68, at 171; Tyler, Private Andlrust
Litigation: 7he Problem of Standing, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 269 (1978).
76. See Note, supra note 25, at 264.
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